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Emoluments, Zones of Interests, and Political
Questions: A Cautionary Tale
by JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN & GAUTHAM RAO*

The "political question" doctrine is hotly contested in 2018, and perhaps
on the verge of its biggest reversal since the Baker v. Carrrevolution. Later
this year, we will learn if the Supreme Court in Whitford v. Gill will regard
extreme partisan gerrymandering as a violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, rather than as a nonjusticiable political question. It turns out
that another high-profile case in the lower courts illuminates the use and
misuse of the political question doctrine. The Emoluments cases, and in
particular, the Southern District of New York's dismissal of CREW v.
Trump,2 offers a cautionary tale about how the political question doctrine is
too often an unconsciously tempting escape for judges facing challenging
legal questions.
The Southern District of New York dismissed the first Emoluments
case, CREW v. Trump. He avoided reaching the merits of the emoluments
claims by finding that the plaintiffs do not have standing to bring the suit. 3
While we disagree with the court on his application of competitor standing,
it is a complicated and close question. The problem is that this decision
contains many serious errors, so that it seems that these close questions did
not receive adequate attention. Two of the court's "prudential standing"

* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Assistant Professor of History,
American University. We note that we are two of the five coauthors of the Legal Historians'
Amicus Brief in CREW v. Trump, Districtof Columbia and Maryland v. Trump, and Blumenthal v.
Trump. We thank our other coauthors John Mikhail, Jack Rakove, and Simon Stem for their terrific
teamwork. We thank Katherine Wright, Sara Nordstrand, and Gail McDonald for their outstanding
research assistance. We also note that, as this Essay was headed to press, the District of Maryland
denied President Donald J. Trump's motion to dismiss, agreeing with this Essay's basic conclusions
about both the zone of interests and the political question doctrine. See District of Columbia and
Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-CV-01596 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51365 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2018).
1. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016), hr'g granted, 137 S. Ct. 2268
(2017) (No. 16-1161).
2. CREW v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), dismissed on Dec. 21, 2017.
3. Id. at 179.
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holdings, on the "zone of interests" test and on the political question doctrine,
are like the proverbial thirteenth and fourteenth strokes of the clock. To
paraphrase the fictional case of Rex v. Haddock (and perhaps Mark Twain,
and George Orwell's 1984), those strokes are not only incorrect of
themselves, but cast doubt on the preceding twelve.
First, we note that we are two of five coauthors of a legal historians'
amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs.4 Our brief does not discuss standing
directly, but it does relate to the zone of interests of the Emoluments clauses.
One reason we helped write this brief is that we thought that some of the
plaintiffs had a strong claim for standing (particularly ROC United, the
association of restaurants who are disadvantaged competitively by Trump's
use of office to draw foreign and domestic state business).
In this Essay, we will briefly describe the Emoluments cases filed
against Trump. Then we will turn to the Southern District's "zone of
interests" argument, which reveals glaring problems. These errors cast a
shadow on the "political question" analysis, which also contains basic errors.
There are certainly times when it is appropriate for courts to invoke the
political question doctrine. However, this episode is a reminder for judges
to slow down and reflect on whether there may be an intuitively appealing
resolution, lest claiming political question is just dodging a tough
constitutional issue.
I. The Emoluments Cases
In CREW v. Trump, the plaintiffs allege that President Trump is
accepting payments and benefits from foreign governments, the federal
government, and the states in violation of the two Emoluments Clauses:
[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall,
without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King,
Prince, or foreign State.5
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during
the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not
receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United
States, or any of them. 6

4.

See Brief for Certain Legal Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, CREW v.

Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
5.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
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There are currently three separate Emoluments cases with various types
of plaintiffs: an anticorruption good-government nonprofit organization
(Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington ("CREW")); the
attorneys general of Maryland and D.C.; two-hundred members of Congress;
and a set of private competitors. This Essay will focus on the competitors.
They relied on Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedents, establishing
that private businesses have standing to challenge government acts that give
an impermissible advantage to competing businesses.
If plaintiffs
"personally compete[] in the same arena" as the entities that received the
illegal advantage, they have "competitor standing." 7
For example, Jill Phaneuf works for a hospitality company, booking
embassy events, and foreign governments' political functions at two D.C.
hotels that compete with the new Trump International Hotel. She is paid per
booking. The Trump International Hotel has hired a "director of diplomatic
sales," who performs the equivalent of Phaneuf's job, so that the two are in
direct competition. Leah Litman has named this Trump employee an
"emolument granter."8 Eric Goode owns a luxury New York hotel. ROC
United is an organization of restaurant employees and owners competing with
Trump Tower restaurants. While there were questions about the specific
degree of competition experienced by each private competitor, the threshold
for factual allegations was low when the DOJ filed its motion to dismiss.
Nevertheless, the district court dismissed the case on standing grounds
without much analysis. First, he wrote that it is "wholly speculative"
whether plaintiffs have been injured by losing foreign and domestic
government business to Trump hotels and restaurants. Second, he doubted
whether the court could redress those injuries. Third, he concluded that the
competitor claims by the plaintiffs did not fall within the "zone of interests"
of the clauses. Fourth, the Foreign Emoluments Clause is a nonjusticiable
political question. Fifth, because Congress has not acted, the Foreign
Emoluments issue is not yet ripe for judicial resolution. It is not clear how
the Foreign Emoluments clause could both be a nonjusticiable political
question and also a justiciable question awaiting ripeness.
Other
commentators have already addressed the shortcomings of the opinion.9 In

7. See, e.g., In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989).
8. Leah Litman, Standing Up for Standing in CREW v. Trump, TAKE CARE BLOG (Apr. 26,
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/standing-up-for-standing-in-crew-v-trump.
9. Leah Litman & Daniel Hemel, On the Ripeness of PottedPlants and Other Non Sequiturs,
TAKE CARE BLOG (Dec. 22, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/on-the-ripeness-of-pottedplants-and-other-non-sequiturs; Michael Dorf, District CourtTries Too Hardto Duck Emoluments
Clause Case, DORF ON LAW (Dec. 27, 2017), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/12/district-courttries-too-hard-to-duck.html.
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this Essay, we will focus on the zone of interest and political question issues,
two "prudential standing" issues.
II. The "Zone of Interests" Analysis
Article III standing depends on injury, traceability, and redressability.
On top of those questions, "prudential standing" can raise questions about
whether the plaintiffs' claims are within the zone of interests of the law and
whether the claims are justiciable. The district court found that the plaintiffs'
competitive disadvantage is not within "the zone of interests" of the two
Emoluments Clauses and that they are not covered by the purposes
envisioned by the Framers in drafting them. On the merits, we think the
court is incorrect. Our amicus brief emphasizes that the Framers focused
intensely on the problem of corruption, and they explained that one of the
chief purposes of the Emoluments Clauses was to guard against corruption
(see, e.g., Edmund Randolph and Alexander Hamilton). One of the primary
and obvious concerns about corruption is that it creates an "unlevel playing
field," "stacking the deck" in favor of some interests-and some
businesses-over others. We will discuss this point more below. But more
glaring is the problem in the district court's legal framing of this argument.
It gets the precedents backwards.
For the sake of clarity, we are pasting the court's introduction of its
"zone of interests" analysis. Please note that it is thin, and it relies almost
exclusively on Wyoming v. Oklahoma, a 1992 Supreme Court decision:
The Hospitality Plaintiffs' Competitive Injuries Do Not Fall Within
the Zone of Interests of the Emoluments Clauses
The zone of interests doctrine demonstrates that the Hospitality
Plaintiffs are not the right parties to bring a claim under the
Emoluments Clauses. Beyond the Article III requirements, "the
federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that
bear on the question of standing." Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. Unitedfor Separationof Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
474 (1982). "One of these is the requirement that the plaintiff establish
that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect
upon him) falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by
the statut[e] [or constitutional guarantee] whose violation forms the
legal basis for his complaint." Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,
468-69 (1992) (emphases in original) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). While it is true that the "zone of interests" test first appeared
in cases brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
702, see Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, the Supreme Court has
"made clear that the same test similarly applies to claims under the
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Constitution in general[." Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 469. In fact, the
Supreme Court has "indicated that it is more strictly applied when a
plaintiff is proceeding under a constitutional .

.

. provision instead of

the generous review provisions of the APA." Id.
original) (citation and quotation marks omitted).10

(emphasis in

The court cited Valley Forge Christian College once for the general
proposition on prudential standing." That decision mentions a "zone of
interests" test once, and only as a matter of overview in dicta, and never
returned to explain it or apply it. So, the district court relied entirely on
Wyoming v. Oklahoma as the precedent for his analysis, citing it three
times. 12 But here is the surprise: It was relying only on the dissent by Justice
Scalia in Wyoming. 13 Even more surprising is that the district court never
acknowledged that it was citing a dissent, rather than a majority opinion.
This is a very basic but very important citation error because there is an
obvious problem whenever one cites a dissent: The majority may have
actually rejected that argument. A lawyer, judge, or scholar needs to alert
the reader of that potential problem. And most troubling is that the district
court twice claimed that it was quoting "the Supreme Court" in Wyoming,
but it was not. It was quoting Justice Scalia's dissent. As of the publication
of this Essay, we can find no record of the Southern District correcting these
errors. To its credit, when the Department of Justice ("DOJ") cited Scalia's
Wyoming dissent in its brief, it clearly signaled it was a dissent with the
appropriate parenthetical: (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The citation errors are part of a more serious substantive problem. It
turns out that six Justices (White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter) rejected Justice Scalia's conclusion, which only persuaded Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. The basic facts of Wyoming, a
dormant commerce clause case, are that Oklahoma required its utilities to
burn mixtures containing at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined coal. The
state of Wyoming does not mine coal but alleges that the Oklahoma statute
reduced the demand for coal mined from Wyoming, which reduces the
amount of taxes paid to the state of Wyoming. This seems like a relatively
marginal and attenuated injury, but six Justices ruled that Wyoming had
standing anyway.

10.

CREW v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

11.

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,

454 U.S. 464 (1982).
12. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
13. Id. at 468-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The majority did not explicitly reject Scalia's "zone of interest" analysis
of Wyoming's interests and the dormant commerce clause's purposes. But
it implicitly addressed this question with a broad interpretation of the
Commerce Clause's federalism concerns: "As such, Wyoming's challenge
under the Commerce Clause precisely 'implicates serious and important
concerns of federalism fully in accord with the purposes and reach of our
original jurisdiction.'"1 4 So, in addition to the significant mistake of relying
on a dissent without acknowledging it, an even bigger problem for the
Southern District's decision is that Wyoming actually rules the opposite way
on the fundamental point upon which it was relying.
The district court did not cite the one precedent the DOJ offered that
seemed to offer some support for a "zone of interest" requirement for
constitutional claims. Though the DOJ did not offer a Supreme Court
precedent actually applying the test to a constitutional claim, it offered a
Second Circuit opinion, Centerfor Reproductive Law & Policy v. Bush, in
which an American non-governmental organization ("NGO") is asserting the
due process rights of foreign NGOs, not its own rights.15 The problem with
this case is the court explains that its "zone of interest" analysis is "coupled
with the rule against asserting the rights of a third party," and this foreignthird-party problem drives the zone of interest analysis:
Plaintiffs' due process claim is based on their allegation that the
challenged restrictions fail to give clear notice of what political
speech, public education, and law reform activities they prohibit and
that they encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

. .

. It is

not the plaintiffs, however, who are allegedly left uncertain of their
rights by unconstitutionally vague language in a government
provision; it is the foreign NGOs who are allegedly left in this
position. Plaintiffs' harm is derivative of this due process-type harm,
and their alleged injury (albeit an unactionable one) concerns First
Amendment interests. Plaintiffs' allegation, simply put, is that the
vague language of the Standard Clause causes the foreign NGOs to be
overly cautious in avoiding interaction with plaintiffs, which in turn
harms plaintiffs' speech and association interests.
On appeal,
plaintiffs expressly acknowledge that "[t]his vagueness claim is
premised on the [restrictions'] chilling effect on protected speech and
association." As plaintiffs do not assert a harm to their own interest
in receiving due process of law, this is precisely the sort of claim that
the prudential standing doctrine is designed to foreclose. Plaintiffs

14.
15.

Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 451 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 744 (1981)).
Ctr. for Reproductive Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183 (2002).
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cannot make their First Amendment claims actionable merely by
attaching them to a third party's due process interests. See Haitian
Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 809 (D.C. Cir.1987) (explaining
that because due process rights "do not protect a relationship" between
a third party and a litigant, a plaintiff "could never have standing to
challenge a statute solely on the ground that it failed to provide due
process to third parties not before the court"). Plaintiffs' due process
claim is therefore dismissed for lack of prudential standing. 16
Perhaps the Southern District understood how distinguishable this
foreign third-party problem was from the domestic first-party claims in the
Emoluments cases, and wisely did not rely upon it.
Moreover, CREW and the amicus briefs raised many good arguments
and precedents for private plaintiffs to invoke structural constitutional
clauses, when the interest of the plaintiff is not the obvious purpose of the
clause. CREW cited Bond v. United States (Tenth Amendment federalism
interest), and Immigration & NaturalizationService v. Chadha (the famous
legislative veto case, in which a noncitizen facing removal raised
bicameralism and presentment concerns).17
An amicus brief by
administrative law scholars (including Litman and Hemel) cited Free
Enterprise v. PCAOB, Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, and Northern Pipeline v.
MarathonPipeline.18 There may be good reasons to distinguish all of these
precedents, but this opinion dismissing CREWs case did not even try.
Most significantly in the long run, all of the plaintiffs in this case raise
claims that do fall under the Emoluments Clauses' zone of interests: anticorruption. Edmund Randolph, delegate to the Constitutional Convention
and the first U.S. Attorney General, explained the Foreign Emoluments
Clause in the Virginia ratifying convention as such: "This restriction is
provided to prevent corruption." 9
In Federalist No. 73, Hamilton
emphasized that the Domestic Emoluments Clause was to guard against
corruption: Congress and the states "can neither weaken [the President's]
fortitude by operating on his necessities, nor corrupt his integrity by
appealing to his avarice." 20 Our legal historians' amicus brief put these
clauses in a larger context of the Founders' anticorruption principles. And
historians understand that one of the reasons Americans fought a revolution

16.
17.
18.
U.S. 211

Ctr. for Reproductive Law & Policy, 304 F.3d at 196.
Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 223 (2011); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Free Enterprise v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514
(1995); and N. Pipeline v. Marathon Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 (1982).

19.

3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 465-66 (1836).

20.

THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
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was because corrupt British policies created an unfair playing field in
commerce and business competition.
The United States emerged as a nation at a moment when transatlantic
political thought was deeply concerned about the intersection of power and
governance. This anxiety chiefly manifested during debates about the
susceptibility of sovereigns and their subordinate officers to wielding their
official powers to enlarge their power and fortunes on the one hand, and on
the other hand, being ensnared by the nefarious designs of others. Thus, the
term "corruption," and its numerous intellectual valences, became the crux
of eighteenth century Anglo-American political thought.
Intellectual historians in the mid-to-late twentieth century argued that this
broad concern with corruption owed to the influence of radical Whig thought
in early eighteenth century England. Bernard Bailyn's Ideological Origins of
the American Revolution, for instance, argued that the English Civil War
provoked a radical Whig opposition that positioned itself as the "country"
faction to confront a power-hungry "court" cabal. 21 These radical Whigs
would become most influential in the 1720s and 1730s due to the leadership of
men such as Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard. According to Bailyn,
Trenchard and Gordon believed that assertive ministerial officers such as Robert
Walpole used the trappings of power such as titles and estates to seduce
legislators to acquiesce to a political agenda that featured growing centralization
of government authority. Corruption was thus both the act of offering and
accepting inducements and the resulting, if more abstract, disruption of the
natural balance of authority between Parliament and the executive.
A precipitant of the Whig concern about corruption was the emergence
of the modern English state, replete with new bureaus and officers to tax,
regulate and channel commerce. Under the Stuart monarchs and through the
arrival of William and Mary, a "financial revolution" had centralized the

21.
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 48-60
(Harvard University Press 1967); see also J. G. A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 401-505 (1975);

M. M. Goldsmith, Public Virtue and Private Vices: Bernard Mandeville and English Political
Ideologies in the Early Eighteenth Century, 9 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 477-510 (Summer
1976); Jessie R. Goodale, J. G. A. Pocock's Neo-Harringtonians:A Reconsideration, 1 HIST. OF
POL. THOUGHT 237-59 (Summer 1980); Thomas Horne, Politicsin a CorruptionSociety: William
Arnall's Defense of Robert Walpole, 41 J. OF THE HIST. OF IDEAS 601, 601-14 (Oct.-Dec. 1980);
MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM 180-81(Princeton
University Press 1994); Simon Targett, Government and Ideology During the Age of Whig
Supremacy: The Political Argument of Sir Robert Walpole's Newspaper Propagandists, 37
HISTORICAL J. 289, 289-317 (June 1994); Robert Sparling, PoliticalCorruptionand the Concept

of Dependence in Republican Thought, 41 POL. THEORY 618, 618-47 (Aug. 2013).
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English state's ability to borrow and access finance capital.
Under the
auspices of the Treasury, the Board of Trade, and other organs of the Crownin-Parliament, officeholders spanned the British Isles and extended British
Empire to collect taxes in order to strengthen creditworthiness and the
government's power to borrow.23 Mercantilism, the economic theory of
channeling colonial commerce through and for the benefit of the metropole,
also required its share of manpower. This centralization of the English state
only heightened fears that the government would use the lure of offices and
title to subvert traditional concepts of English liberty.
This Whig fear of corruption would find its way into the British colonies
in North America and become a central structure of colonial political thought
before and especially during the American Revolution. According to
Gordon S. Wood's riff on Bailyn's influential work, corruption was among
other "inflammatory phrases" that became the stuff of colonial politics and
precipitants of the American Revolution. Writing of American politics in
these years, Wood explains, "one cannot but be struck by the predominant
characteristics of fear and frenzy, the exaggerations and the enthusiasm," and
finally, "the general sense of social corruption and disorder" flowing from
the metropole. 24 Corruption seemed to be everywhere by the 1760s:
sabotaging the structure of politics, stacking the decks of mercantilism, and
coloring the pages of British propaganda.25
Puritanism was of the cultural frameworks through which Englishspeaking American colonists made sense of the Whig critique of corruption.
As Edmund Morgan explained, the Protestant Ethic and all it entailedfrugality and public conscience-had become part of how Americans
understood their political process by the eighteenth century. The Puritan
Ethic thus almost predetermined a colonial critique of corruption. For those
so taken by the ethic, "the human capacity for corruption had transformed
the balanced government of King, Lords, and Commons into a singleminded body of rulers bent on their own enrichment and heedless of the

22.

CARL WENNERLIND, CASUALTIES OF CREDIT: THE ENGLISH FINANCIAL REVOLUTION,

1620-1720 (2011); Patrick K. O'Brien, The PoliticalEconomy of British Taxation, 1660-1815, 41
ECON. HIST. REV. 1, 1-32 (Feb. 1988); P. G. M. DICKSON, THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION IN
ENGLAND: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC CREDIT, 1688-1756 (Routledge, 1967);
JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY
INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., The MIT Press, 1962).
23. JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY, AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 16881783 (1989); MICHAEL J. BRADDICK, THE NERVES OF THE STATE: TAXATION AND THE FINANCING
OF THE ENGLISH STATE, 1558-1714 (1996).
24.

Gordon S. Wood, Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution, 23 WM. & MARY

3, 25 (1966).
25. Id. at 21, 25, 28-29.
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26

public good." This was particularly so when it came to the imperial officers
who proliferated in the colonies after 1756. "To Americans bred on the values
of the Puritan Ethic," concludes Morgan, "England seemed to have fallen prey
to her own opulence, and the government shared heavily in the corruption." 27
The Puritan critique thus centered around the concept that the British
government dispersed its officers to profit from the colonists' good works.28
Americans perceived that the British had privileged monopolistic
power of its own favored businesses, to the disadvantage of American
colonial competition.
The English before Empire already criticized
monopolies. Lord Edward Coke wrote in 1599 that monopolies "do not
conduce to the public weal." 29 Americans' colonial experience underscored
this point. In the mid-seventeenth century, the English began regulating
trade in the colonies. In 1651, Parliament passed the Navigation Acts for the
advantage of the English at the expense of the colonies, prohibiting trade
with other European powers. American merchants were angry and started
organizing politically. 30 After colonists began to compete more directly with
English businesses, the English created the Dominion of New England in
1686 to regulate and disadvantage the colonists as competitors. 31 Americans
rose up during the Glorious Revolution to overthrow the Dominion regime. 32
Even after the Glorious Revolution, the British increasingly turned to
tax policy and regulation to limit the colonists' ability to compete.
Americans perceived these policies as harming their economy and their
capacity to compete. 33 The Currency Act, Sugar Act, the Stamp Act, and the
Townshend Acts each limited colonial business activity. The Colonists
reacted by organizing boycotts of British goods, fighting anticompetitive
regulation with anticompetition boycotts.
Americans also turned to
smuggling, which increased tensions with the British.
These events

26.

Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, 24 WM. & MARY

Q. 3, 14, 15, 18 (1967).
27.
28.

Id. at 3, 14, 15, 18.
Id. at 3, 14, 15, 18.

29.

ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 78 (2014).

30.
Gary M. Walton, The New Economic History andthe Burdens of the NavigationActs, 24
ECON. HIST. REv. 533, 533-42 (1971); CARLA GARDINA PESTANA, THE ENGLISH ATLANTIC IN
AN AGE OF REVOLUTION: 1640-1661 120 (2007).
31.
VIOLA FLORENCE BARNES, THE DOMINION OF NEW ENGLAND: A STUDY IN BRITISH
COLONIAL POLICY (Yale University Press 1923).
32. JOHN PALFREY, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND: HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND DURING THE
STUART DYNASTY 596 (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1864).
33.

1943).

JOHN C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 95-99 (Little, Brown, & Co.
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ultimately led to the Boston Massacre of 1770.34 In 1773, Parliament passed
the Tea Act which similarly privileged British corporations (particularly the
East India Company), and limited colonial competition-and thus followed
the Boston Tea Party. 35 Some Anti-Federalists refused to sign the
Constitution because it lacked an antimonopoly provision.36 In many ways,
the American revolution is a story of the British using governmental
power-with corrupt self-dealing-to frustrate colonial competition.3 7
The Americans put the Emoluments clauses in the context of Louis XIV
buying influence over the English Kings Charles II and James II during this
period. In the secret Treaty of Dover of 1670, Louis XIV paid Charles II
(and supplied a young French mistress) to bribe Charles to convert to
Catholicism and to buy an alliance with France in an ill-advised war against
the Dutch. In 1687, Louis XIV secretly paid Charles's successor, James II,
for further shady allegiances. 38 The English had their suspicions of Catholic
conspiracies, which led to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and which in
turn inspired the American Revolution and the Founding. But intriguingly,
historians did not find hard evidence of the secret payments until 177 1.
At the Federal Convention, Gouverneur Morris, regarded as a chief architect
of the presidency, explicitly invoked this episode during the July 20, 1787,
debate over impeachment:
Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life interest, much
less like one having a hereditary interest in his office. He may be
bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would say
that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first
Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard agst it by
displacing him. One would think the King of England well secured
agst bribery. He has as it were a fee simple in the whole Kingdom.
Yet Charles II was bribed by Louis XIV. 4 0

34.

HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE (W.W. Norton & Co. 1996).

35.
BENJAMIN L. CARP, DEFIANCE OF THE PATRIOTS: THE BOSTON TEA PARTY AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICA (2010); MLLER, supra note 33, at 353-76.
36.

TEACHOUT, supra note 29.

37.

See Steven Calabresi & Larissa Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution:A History

of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 983 (2013); Franklin D. Jones, Historical
Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE L.J. 42, 49-50 (1926).
38.

GEORGE CLARK, THE LATER STUARTS (1660-1714) 86-87, 130 (2d ed. 1956); BARRY

COWARD, THE STUART AGE: 1603-1714 262-65, 267, 274-75 (1980).
39.
See J.P. KENYON, THE HISTORY MEN. THE HISTORICAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND SINCE
THE RENAISSANCE 67-68 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2d. ed., 1993).
40.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 68-69 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
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Morris did not use the word "emolument" here, but he still offers some key
background context for why the framers prohibited foreign emoluments.
Moreover, two prominent early commentators on the Constitution, St. George
Tucker4 1 and William Rawle,42 emphasized Charles II and the Secret Treaty
of Dover as the specific background for the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
The framers understood that emoluments fed corrupt uses of power, and
corrupt uses of power led to self-dealing and anticompetitive regulations.
For generations, Americans have understood corruption in terms of unfair
competition. And thus, it is puzzling that the district court did not see the
link between these historic interests that deeply resonate today.
And then there is this sentence in the opinion, which, we must confess,
we find totally confusing:
Therefore, the Hospitality Plaintiffs' theory that the Clauses protect
them from increased competition in the market for government
business must be rejected, especially when (1) the Clauses offer no
protection from increased competition in the market for nongovernment business and (2) with Congressional consent, the
Constitution allows federal officials to accept foreign gifts and
emoluments, regardless of its effect on competition. 43
Is the court suggesting that the plaintiffs want to be protected from all
competition? Their claim is that the market for foreign government business
and domestic government business is unfairly skewed by unconstitutional
emoluments, which creates an injury in a particular market. The plaintiffs
might be disadvantaged in permissible ways by Trump's presidency, but that
does not eliminate the smaller but still concrete injury from impermissible
emoluments.
The plaintiffs are not seeking protection against legal
nongovernment business. As for (2), Congress has not consented to these
emoluments, perhaps because of their corrupt effect on competition, and
moreover, President Trump will not disclose his income from foreign and

41.
1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE
TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 295-96 (1803) ("In the
reign of Charles the second of England, that prince, and almost all of his officers of state were either
actual pensioners of the court of France, or supposed to be under its influence, directly or indirectly,
from that cause. The reign of that monarch has been accordingly proverbially disgraceful to his
memory.")
42.

WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

120

(Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin, 1829) ("[I]t is now known that in England a profligate prince
[Charles II] and many of his venal courtiers were bribed into measures injurious to the nation by

the gold of Louis XIV.")
43. CREW v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
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domestic state sources. Invoking what Congress might or might not do to
make foreign payments legal has no bearing on the merits now of the injury.
Moreover, Congress can only consent to foreign emoluments. The court's
second point does not address the Domestic Clause. Readers of this opinion
leave the zone of "zone of interests" more confused than when they entered.
We add one more note on the zone of interests: the court at least
acknowledged a federalism interest in the clauses, which bodes well for the
pending case Maryland v. Trump in the District Court of Maryland. Our
legal historians' amicus brief emphasizes the states' federalism interests at
the heart of both clauses.

III. The "Political Question" Question
In Baker, the Supreme Court listed six characteristics of a nonjusticiable
political question: (1) a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department"; (2) a "lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"; (3) the
"impossibility for a court's independent resolution without expressing a lack
of respect for a coordinate branch of the government"; (4) the "impossibility
of deciding the issue without an initial policy decision, which is beyond the
discretion of the court"; (5) an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made"; or (6) the "potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.""
There are certainly times when judges appropriately invoke the political
question doctrine. The Constitution assigns the rules of impeachment and
removal to each House, and "Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings, [and] punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour." 45 The
district court added the Foreign Emolument clause as nonjusticiable, because
it is, in its view, solely a political question: "As the explicit language of the
Foreign Emoluments Clause makes clear, this is an issue committed
exclusively to Congress."4 6 Beware of the words "explicit," "clear," and
"exclusively." The clause gives Congress a voice on the foreign emoluments
issue, but it most certainly does not do so exclusively.
During oral argument, it was surprising that the court spent so much
time on this argument, so one of us wrote up a post addressing this straining

44.
45.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.

46.

CREW v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
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47

of the Foreign Emoluments clause's text.
The court emphasized the
Foreign Emoluments clause's text: "No person holding any office of profit
or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any
present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king,
prince, or foreign state." 48

At oral argument, the court asked (we are paraphrasing here), "Why
doesn't the political question doctrine apply? The clause assigns the power
to Congress to consent or not. If the President is taking emoluments from
foreign governments, let Congress weigh in." CREW's Deepak Gupta gave
a clear answer then: "Because that approach would flip the clause on its head.
The structure is a clear rule, with exceptions given to Congress. It's a ban,
but Congress can create exceptions to the ban. If you say it is nonjusticiable,
then you flip the script: you turn it into a broad permission to accept
emoluments, unless Congress says no. That's the opposite of the text and
the Framers' purpose."
The court replied: "Congress has the power to prevent emoluments if it
wants to."
Gupta answered that constitutional clauses are justiciable unless they
are exclusively assigned to another branch, and if there are no manageable
rules. He emphasized that the DOJ (through the Office of Legal Counsel)
has crafted manageable rules over many generations and many cases.
In its decision, the court first acknowledged that the DOJ never
explicitly argued that the Foreign Emoluments Clause was a political
question. The fact that the DOJ did not make this argument should have
been a cautionary yellow flag. But the court went down this path anyway.
He relied on just two Supreme Court cases, both on the particularly
nettlesome gerrymandering problem: Baker v. Carrand Vieth v. Jubelirer.49
Gerrymandering is the classic political question case, for which there is no
constitutional text directly on point (and thus courts turn to the Fourteenth
Amendment's broad Equal Protection Clause). Nevertheless, in Baker v.
Carr, the Supreme Court rejected the political question doctrine. If the
Supreme Court could tackle the politics of gerrymandering with the
Fourteenth Amendment, it surely can adjudicate emoluments with
Emoluments Clauses. Vieth, on partisan gerrymanders, presented a much

47. Jed Shugerman, Is the Foreign Emoluments Clause Only a "Political Question" for
Congress?, SHUGERBLOG (Oct. 20, 2017), https://shugerblog.com/2017/10/20/is-the-foreignemoluments-clause-only-a-political-question-for-congress/. See also Joshua Matz, Will Trump's
Lawyers Rewrite and Invert the Emoluments Clause?, TAKE CARE BLOG, (Apr. 18, 2017)
https://takecareblog.com/blog/will-trump-s-lawyers-rewrite-and-invert-the-emoluments-clause.

48.
49.

CREW v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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thornier problem in the political thicket, and the Supreme Court may be on
the verge of clearing through that thicket this term. The Foreign Emoluments
Clause isn't in this political thicket at all.
The court emphasized the first factor under Baker v. Carr's
justiciability test: "[A] case may be dismissed on the basis of the political
question doctrine if there exists: '[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue [at hand] to a coordinate political department. "'50
After describing the factors and precedents in two paragraphs, the court
provided just two paragraphs of cursory analysis that confuse the possibility
of Congressional action with exclusive commitment to Congress, as opposed
to another branch.
The Foreign Emoluments clause is not the only place in the Constitution
that uses a similar structure: a barring of an act, with a grant of a power to
Congress to make exceptions. In fact, right after the Foreign Emoluments
Clause, the following section of the Constitution offers two other examples
with prohibitions on state power and with the same language, "without the
Consent of Congress."
The first is in Article I, Section 10, Clause 2:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts
or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all
Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be
for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws
shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 52
According to the court's interpretation, this clause should be
nonjusticiable. Congress can always declare or legislate its nonconsent, so
this clause would be a political question. In fact, this clause adds that these
state laws are "subject to Revision and Controul of the Congress," so
accordingly, this clause has an even stronger case to be a political question
relative to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.53 Nevertheless, we can find
about two dozen Supreme Court cases ruling on this clause, treating it as

50.
51.
52.
53.

CREW v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
U.S. CONST. art. I, §10.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, ci. 2.
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54

clearly justiciable.
It is particularly interesting to see that Chief Justice
John Marshall wrote one such opinion in Brown v. Maryland.
The next clause in Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 is similar:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay. 56
Again, this clause contains the same textual hook: a blanket prohibition,
with an exception for congressional consent. Yet the Supreme Court has
treated this clause as justiciable, ruling on tonnage duties under this clause
at least a dozen times. It has ruled on the troops provision, 8 and there are
countless cases on interstate compacts.59
54. See, e.g., Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976); Kosydar v. Nat'l Cash
Register Co., 417 U.S. 62 (1974); Canton R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951); Empresa
Siderurgica v. Cty. of Merced, 337 U.S. 154 (1949); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), overruled
by Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984); McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309
U.S. 414 (1940); Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933); Gulf
Fisheries Co. v. Maclnerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928); Crew Levick Co. v. Pa., 245 U.S. 292 (1917);
Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418 (1904); F. May & Co. v. City of New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900);
Schollenberger v. Pa., 171 U.S. 1 (1898); Patapsco Guano Co. v. Bd. of Agric. of N.C., 171 U.S.
345 (U.S. 1898); Bowman v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888); Cook v. Pa., 97 U.S. 566
(1878); Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. 29 (1871); Turner v. Md., 107 U.S. 38 (1883); Waring v. Mayor,
75 U.S. 110 (1868); Woodruffv. Parham, 75 U.S. 123 (1868); Pervearv. Mass., 72 U.S. 475 (1866);
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851); Nathan v. La., 49 U.S. 73 (1850); Mager v. Grima,
49 U.S. 490 (1850); Brown v. Md., 25 U.S. 419 (1827).
55. Brown v. Md., 25. U.S. 419 (1827).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 3.
57. See, e.g., Clyde Mallory Lines v. Ala., 296 U.S. 261 (1935); Ouachita & M.R. Packet Co.
v. Aiken, 121 U.S. 444 (1887); Morgan's La. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455
(1886); Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543 (1886); Parkersburg & OR. Transp. Co. v. City of
Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1883); Cincinnati, P., B.S. & P. Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S.
559 (1881); Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273 (1879); Nw. Union Packet Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 100 U.S. 423 (1879); Keokuk N. Line Packet Co. v. City of Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 (1877);
Cannon v. City of New Orleans, 87 U.S. 577 (1874); City of Vicksburg v. Tobin (1879); Exparte
McNiel, 80 U.S. 236 (1871); Peete v. Morgan, 86 U.S. 581 (1873; S. S. S. Co. of New Orleans v.
Portwardens, 73 U.S. 31 (1867); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
58. See, e.g., Phila. & S. M. S.S. Co. v. Pa., 122 U.S. 326 (1887); Presser v. Ill., 116 U.S. 252
(1886); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa., 114 U.S. 196, (1885); Wiggins Ferry Co. v. City of E. St.
Louis, 107 U.S. 365 (1883); Osborne v. City of Mobile, 83 U.S. 479, (1872), overruled in part by
Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, (1888); In re State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. 204 (1870).
59. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978); N.H. v. Me.,
426 U.S. 363 (1976); Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); State ex rel. Dyer v.
Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
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The same section of the Constitution that includes the Foreign
Emoluments Clause provides another broad proscription on the executive
branch, with a similar recognition of Congress's powers: Art I, Sec. 9, cl. 7:
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law." 60 Here again the Constitution provides a
prohibition, unless Congress consents (by passing an appropriations
measure). Yet there are a dozen Supreme Court cases that have treated the
clause as justiciable.
And yet there is more: the creation of new states has a similar structure.
"[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States,
or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress."62 It turns out that the Supreme Court
has adjudicated this clause often.63
Imagine if California tried to split into two states. Imagine next that a
Democratic Senate decided to seat an extra two Democratic Senators, while a

(1938); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Ariz. v. Cal., 292 U.S. 341 (1934); Olin
v. Kitzmiller, 259 U.S. 260 (1922); Stearns v. Minn., 179 U.S. 223 (1900); St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co.
v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896); Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155 (1894); Va. v. Tenn., 148 U.S. 503
(1893); Pa. v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518 (1851); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540
(1840); Poole v. Fleeger's Lessee, 36 U.S. 185 (1837); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 57 (1823).
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
61. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990); Cincinnati Soap Co.
v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937); Allen v. Smith, 173 U.S. 389 (1899); Austin v. United States,
155 U.S. 417 (1894); Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62 (1886); United States v. Price, 116 U.S.
43 (1885); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871);
Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272 (1850).
62. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
63. See, e.g., Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); Minn. v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469 (1988);
Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v.

Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); United States v. Me., 420 U.S. 515 (1975); Ala.
v. Tex., 347 U.S. 272 (1954); United States v. La., 339 U.S. 699 (1950); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); John v.
Paullin, 231 U.S. 583 (1913); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); City of Cincinnati v.
Louisville & N.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390 (1912); Exparte Webb, 225 U.S. 663 (1912); Joy v. City of
St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (1906); Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908); United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1 (1894); Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Willamette Iron-Bridge
Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888); Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U.S. 288 (1887); Huse v.
Glover, 119 U.S. 543 (1886); Brown v. Grant, 116 U.S. 207 (1886); Escanaba & Lake Mich.
Transp. Co. v. City ofChi., 107 U.S. 678 (1883); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881);
Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. 57 (1873); Baker v. Morton, 79 U.S. 150 (1870);
Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. 160 (1864); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. 84 (1857); Hunt v. Palao, 45
U.S. 589 (1846); Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845); Martin v.
Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
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Republican President and a Republican House rejected the creation of a North
California and a South California. What if the Senate passed legislation with
the help of those two Senators? And what if California sent an extra pair of
electors to the Electoral College? I imagine the courts would rule on these
questions (although they would handle the question of standing separately).
For another example, turn to the appointment power in Art II, Sec. 2:
"[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States." 64
What if President Obama had decided that Congress's silence on his
nomination of Judge Garland to the Supreme Court or his nomination of
Elizabeth Warren to head an agency was tantamount to implicit consent?
Could these appointments be challenged in court? Surely if Justice Garland
tried to rule on a case or if agency head Warren tried to regulate a bank, a
plaintiff would have a day in court to challenge the legitimacy of those
appointments. The Senate's potential power to vote yes or no does not
eliminate the judiciary's role.
The district court surely does not mean to push his interpretation this far,
but if one applied this logic to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments, would those transformational amendments be rendered
nonjusticiable political questions? Each of those amendments contains a clause
that permits Congress to legislate the enforcement of these amendments.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states, "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."65
Arguably, we have a set of prohibitions protecting individual rights to
equal protection, privileges and immunities, and due process of law, but the
enforcement of these rights is explicitly granted to Congress. An extension
of this textual approach would be to say that the Fourteenth Amendment
assigns enforcement explicitly to Congress, so the enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a political question and nonjusticiable
(notwithstanding the Court's proportionality and congruence jurisprudence).
He can't possibly mean that as a matter of textual interpretation. But two
cursory paragraphs of analysis of the Foreign Emoluments Clause seems to
open the door to such untenable results.
In a footnote, the court wrote, "Congress is not a potted plant. It is a
coequal branch of the federal government with the power to act as a body in
response to Defendant's alleged Foreign Emoluments Clause violations, if it

64.
65.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 5.
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66

chooses to do so." But the possibility that Congress might one day legislate
would render nonjusticiable any case relying on a federal statute and
administrative action. That cannot be correct. As Hemel and Litman observe:
[T]he fact that Congress could-hypothetically-consent to an action
can't be enough (or even be a reason) to conclude that a plaintiff lacks
standing to challenge that action on the grounds that Congress hasn't
authorized it. Otherwise, there would never be standing when a
plaintiff challenges ultra vires executive action-executive action that
exceeds the scope of congressionally delegated authority, or executive
action that violates a statutory prohibition. In all of those cases,
Congress could have authorized the action, but didn't. The same
would be true in dormant commerce clause cases-no plaintiff would
have standing to challenge a dormant commerce clause violation
because Congress could always consent to and thus cure the
violation.

67

The Framers drafted many clauses in the Constitution with a broad
prohibition, but with the power of Congress to make exceptions and
permissions. Two clauses use the exact same language of "without the
consent of Congress." Nevertheless, the courts have treated those clauses as
justiciable over and over again, from Chief Justice Marshall's court through
modern cases. The courts certainly have not treated the language of these
clauses as committing issues "exclusively" to Congress, to paraphrase the
district court. The Foreign Emoluments Clause offers a manageable text for
courts to interpret, even if Congress remains silent, and even if Congress
makes some exceptions.

Conclusion
The district court's dismissal of the CREW plaintiffs contained many
significant errors. In its section on "zone of interests," the reliance on a
dissent was not just a problem of misciting. It misunderstood that the
majority opinion had rejected the Scalia dissent upon which it was relying.
And more importantly, it misunderstood this area of law and erred in its
interpretation of the anticorruption purposes of the clause. In its section on
the political question, it relied on a Supreme Court precedent that counseled
the opposite result (Baker) and it overlooked a series of similar clauses that
counseled the opposite textual interpretation. In both sections, the decision

66. CREW v. Trump, No. 1:17-CV-00458 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210326, at *42 n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 2017).
67. Litman & Hemel, supra note 9.
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did not engage many precedents that either raised significant questions or
reached a different result. If this decision made so many errors on "zone of
interests" analysis and its political question analysis, it would be a mistake
to rely too heavily on its analysis of standing doctrine, either.
For the bigger picture, this lower court opinion is a cautionary tale for other
judges who consider relying on the "passive virtues," in Alexander Bickel's
phrasing, 68 of the political question doctrine. Of course, there is a time and a
place for the political question doctrine: national security, foreign policy, and
arguably even a closely contested election and the electoral college.69
But for too long, judges used the political question doctrine to punt on
gerrymandering by grossly unequal districts, until Baker v. Carr and
Reynolds v. Sims. Then judges punted too long in tolerating racial
gerrymandering. Then the Supreme Court punted on partisan gerrymanders
in Vieth v. Jubilerer. As they face ever more abusive partisan gerrymanders
by Republicans in Wisconsin and Democrats in Maryland, will the Justices
be tempted to punt with the political question doctrine again? The Southern
District offers a reminder for the Justices to pause and reflect: Are we relying
on the political doctrine because of deep principles and deference to
democratic structures? Or are we avoiding a difficult but still justiciable
legal problem? In both the Emoluments cases and the gerrymandering cases,
it is time for judges to face these challenges and do their best to address them,
even if the solutions are imperfect.

68.

ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).

69. Bush v. Gore arguably should have been left to the electoral college, as the framers may
have intended the resolution of elections too close to call around election day. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS

(2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1093
(2001).

